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The global repercussions of economic developments in 
China are increasingly important, given this country’s 
growing weight in the world economy in recent decades 
and its central role in multilateral trade flows (see Chart 1). 
Trade relationships between countries are nowadays 
more complex than a few decades ago, in a setting 
characterised by international fragmentation of production 
through “global value chains”. For instance, the final use 
of Spain’s exports to China, which may incorporate value 
added from third countries, is either to satisfy the domestic 
demand of this Asian country, or else as an input for new 
exports from China to other countries. Likewise, some 
Spanish exports to other countries will be incorporated 
into the production of goods and services that will, in turn, 
ultimately be exported to China. For example, almost half 
of Spain’s exports to the rest of the European Union are 
intermediate goods and services, which are used as 
inputs in the production of other goods and services in 
these countries.
This box explores a particular aspect of the Chinese 
economy’s trade relationship with the euro area and 
Spain: the links through European value chains. For this 
purpose it uses the information contained in world input-
output tables,1 which enables the origin of the value 
added incorporated into the exports from one country to 
another to be traced and broken down by final use. 
Estimates of the impact of a hypothetical slowdown in 
China on the main euro area economies based on this 
approximation are presented.
Chart 2 shows the value added of the euro area, and its 
four main economies, attributable to Chinese domestic 
demand. In the specific case of Spain, this has increased 
significantly in recent years, to stand at 0.9% of GDP in 
2015, up 0.7 percentage points (pp) from 2005. A 
significant part of this link is generated through European 
production chains, since 27% of the Spanish value added 
that satisfies domestic demand in China is incorporated 
into the exports of the rest of the European Union (in 
particular, 8% through German exports). As regards 
Spain’s sectoral exposure, Chinese domestic demand is 
more important for wholesale and retail trade, professional 
services, transport, chemicals and motor vehicles (see 
Chart 3). European value chains are especially important 
in the motor vehicles and machinery sectors. In 
comparative terms, Spain’s link to China in terms of value 
added is half that of the euro area as a whole, and a third 
of that of Germany, which, of the main euro area 
economies, has the strongest relationship with the 
Chinese economy (see Chart 2 again). 
Chart 4 presents some simulations of the impact on the 
value added of the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain, of a hypothetical slowdown in the Chinese 
economy that is sharper than that projected by the main 
analysts, using, again, the information contained in input-
output tables. The main justification for this slowdown is 
linked to the far-reaching and difficult-to-fine-tune 
structural rebalancing currently taking place in this 
economy, resulting from policies to boost private 
consumption relative to investment (with greater import 
content), domestic relative to external demand,2 and 
services relative to industry. Three scenarios approximating 
different aspects of this structural transformation process 
are presented in the chart.3 The first scenario (“no 
rebalancing”) assumes that final demand declines, but 
that its composition remains unchanged, the second 
(“investment rebalancing”) considers that the additional 
slowdown is entirely due to lower investment, while the 
third (“foreign demand rebalancing”) assumes a reduction 
in imports of final goods.
As seen in Chart 4, the largest adverse effect corresponds 
to the third scenario of reduced imports of final products. 
In that case, a fall in Chinese imports equal to 1 pp of GDP 
reduces value added in the euro area by 0.2 pp,4 mainly 
due to the effect on the German economy. The negative 
impact under the second scenario is larger than that 
under the “no-rebalancing” scenario, owing to the higher 
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1  See, for example, R. Koopman, Z. Wang and S.-J. Wei (2014), “Tracing Value-Added and Double Counting in Gross Exports”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 104, pp. 459-494. 
2  The foreign value added incorporated into Chinese exports as a percentage of the total exports of this economy, which approximates 
the import content of exports, has fallen by 9 pp since 2005.
3	 	The	magnitude	of	 the	shocks	under	the	three	scenarios	 is	equivalent	 to	1%	of	 the	GDP	of	China.	Specifically,	an	adjustment	 is	
simulated	of	around	USD	100	billion	(1%	of	China’s	GDP	in	2015)	in	final	demand	(first	scenario),	investment	(second	scenario)	and	
imports	of	final	products	(third	scenario).
4  Approximately 10% of the value added associated with euro area exports to China.
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SOURCES: CEIC, OECD TiVA and own calculations based on WIOD 2016.
Note: Estimation of the spillover effect in an initial round under the assumption that there will be no changes in the productive structure.
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import content of investment than of final demand as a 
whole, and to the specialisation of some euro area 
economies in capital goods. In this respect, at industry 
level, the largest fall would occur in capital goods 
manufacture and, specifically, in machinery, the value 
added of which would fall by 0.5 pp in Spain and by 
almost 2 pp in Germany. The smaller negative impact on 
the Spanish economy under the three simulated scenarios 
is mainly due to the higher weight of its exports of 
consumer goods and services to China, as compared 
with the greater importance of capital goods, in particular, 
in the other countries. 
These simulations, although illustrative, have certain 
limitations, as the approach used focuses exclusively on 
trade relationships. In particular, other channels through 
which the slowdown in China may affect the European 
economies, such as the commodity markets channel, the 
global financial system channel and the channel that operates 
through uncertainty and global confidence, are not analysed.5 
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5  The dynamic effects on productive specialisation and trade composition, and the reaction of prices are not considered either. For 
example, X. Bing, M. Roth and D. Santabárbara (2019), “Impacto global de una desaceleración en China”, Analytical Article, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2019, use the NiGEM global macroeconomic model to simulate a 1 pp fall in Chinese growth considering all the 
above-mentioned	channels	and	find	that	the	overall	impact	on	the	euro	area	economies	would	be	significantly	more	negative	than	
that considered in this box.
